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Abstract. The paper discusses the dynamics of peace initiatives made by Pakistan in 2006 
and their importance in changing the regional dynamics in favour of increased economic 
cooperation in the light of the study undertaken by Murshed & Mamoon (2007) which has 
analysed the multiple determinants of conflict between India and Pakistan. The paper 
highlights the importance of peace in the region especially for Pakistan where the 
development potential of the country have been stifled greatly due to a long history of 
political and economic volatility while linking Pakistan’s progress with that of its 
neighbours through conflict mitigation process. The paper also presents the possibility of 
such dyadic economic and conflict trade off in 1990s where India may have utilised 
hostilities to curtail Pakistani economic potential to pressurise Pakistan to forego its support 
of insurgency in Indian held Kashmir. Pakistani peace initiatives in 2006 made the country 
as a leading factor in South Asia with a valid possibility of determining the pace and 
potential to realise long sought process of regional progress through greater integration of 
interests. However, the tangible response from Indian side was not forthcoming leading to 
loss of opportunities and thus creating a good explanation of Hawkish Indian behaviour 10 
years down the time line in 2017.  
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1. Introduction 
nternational economic interactions between nations may involve peaceful trade, 
or it could be belligerent with reduced economic interaction. Outright war is 
just one manifestation of the rivalry between nations; the armed peace is 
equally consistent with aggressiveness. India and Pakistan are a case in point. They 
have had at least four large scale military confrontations (1948, 1965, 1971 and 
1999), but otherwise spend a great deal of time in uncompromising posturing vis-à-
vis each other. India, in particular, frequently accuses Pakistan of sponsoring 
terrorism in her territory. But occasionally they make goodwill gestures, such as 
sending out peace buses between cities like Delhi and Lahore, and agree to cricket 
tours.  Less frequently, major concessions are made mainly by Pakistan, such as 
current President Musharraf’s willingness to put aside the long standing Pakistani 
demand and United Nations resolution for a plebiscite to settle the future of 
Kashmir [Retrieved from]. 
Polachek (1997) and Polachek & Seiglie (2006) argue that wars and disputes 
between geographically contiguous states involve greater losses, as more efficient 
geographically proximate trade is displaced. This effect, however, depends on the 
absence of alternative trading partners, who despite greater distance may be equally 
or more efficient. India-Pakistan official trade (as a proportion of Pakistan’s total 
international trade) steadily declined from nearly 20% in the early 1950s, 
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plummeting to almost zero after their war in 1965, and has shown some signs of 
recovery in the 1990s. But it is still below the levels of the 1950s, which was 
shortly after the two nations were separated politically. This is despite the fact that 
India and Pakistan have fairly open economies at the present. Though, Pakistan has 
traditionally been more open than India.  
The opportunity costs of conflict could rise when countries move to higher 
stages of economic development as they have more to lose from conflict, and have 
more resources to negotiate peaceful settlements. For example, the 1990s is 
considered to be a golden decade for India as on average the Indian economy grew 
at 5-6% annually. Pakistan has been growing at an average of 6% for the last 3 to 4 
years. Traditionally, from the early 1960s up to the early 1990s, Pakistan’s was the 
faster growing economy of the two. In 2006 both countries were in the second most 
rapidly growing region (South Asia) in the world (World Development Indicators, 
2006). However the below figure also shows that yearly fatality rate (number of 
deaths in the battle) has been more frequent and at historically higher levels for 
1990s and the trend continues up till 2002. Considering 2006 peace talks between 
India and Pakistan the fatality levels have declined considerably in immediate 
years. 
 
 
Figure 1.Does economic growth increase the possibility of peace 
 
Furthermore, the above figure also shows that military expenditures tend to 
move inversely with development (education) expenditure, providing prima facie 
evidence that large military expenditure crowds out development in the social 
sector. Pakistan’s military expenditure is consistently above India’s except in the 
mid-1960s when India had wars with both China and Pakistan. In Pakistan’s case, 
military expenditure as a proportion of GDP has historically been at 5%, but rising 
during and after its 1965 and 1971 wars with India to as high as 8%. The average 
defence expenditure of Pakistan is 5.5% of GDP in the 1950-2005 period, whereas 
for India it is about half at 2.8% of GDP. Since the 1990s Pakistan’s military 
expenditure has been falling, and is now at a little above 4% of GDP, which 
represents a historical low. As Indian education expenditure rose to 4 % of GDP in 
the1990s, its defence expenditure fell from nearly 4% of GDP in the mid-1960s to 
less than 3% of GDP (it has rarely been below 2% of GDP). Pakistan’s public 
expenditure on education is stagnating at around 2% of GDP. An important 
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observation which can be made from the figure is a sharp rise in military personnel 
in recent years despite a fall in proportional defence budgets by both sides 
indicating a rise in militarization by India and Pakistan corresponding to the rise in 
fatality levels. Here militarization in India has increased at a much steeper pace 
than Pakistan which may show Indian security concerns or its hegemonic posture 
in the region. Again note that the figures are available till year 2002. By 2006, due 
to Pakistan’s peace initiatives and its serious efforts to control cross border 
movement of unwanted personnel at the Line of Control (LOC) has significantly 
reduced the hostility levels which may correspond to a possibility of fall in 
militarization in the region.  
Nevertheless, as the varying trends discussed above in the determinants of 
possible hostilities suggest: there is more to India-Pakistan conflict than merely 
Pakistan’s political orientation and a comparison of bilateral economic growth 
rates. This is because of the fact that despite high growth rates in India and 
relatively high democracy scores in Pakistan up to 1999, conflict between the 
countries escalated in the 1990s. By contrast, in 2006 the dictatorial regime in 
Pakistan with a strong military orientation and therefore historically less 
democratic, was making major unilateral concessions to India vis-à-vis their long 
standing disputes over Kashmir. Could that be related to the very impressive 
growth record in Pakistan?  If anything, conflict between the two nations can be 
best understood in a multivariate framework where the relevant variables and 
processes (economic performance, integration with rest of the world, trade between 
the conflicting nations, military expenditure, democracy, and population) are 
simultaneously taken into account.  
 
2. Lessons from quantitative study by Murshed & Mamoon 
(2007) 
A comprehensive exercise has been carried out by Murshed & Mamoon (2007) 
to objectively analyze the key variables which would help us understand various 
overlapping dynamic factors of India-Pakistan conflict. Such an analysis also helps 
us to device a successful peace strategy based on its economic and security 
dividends. A simple time series model was devised and an evolutionary analysis of 
India and Pakistan conflict from 1950 to 2002 was carried out where role of 
economic development, integration with rest of the world, bilateral trade, military 
expenditure and democracy was analyzed to see how these variables may have 
contributed to the increase or decrease in hostilities between these two nations. 
Such an exercise is also important to understand the validity of such single point 
one sided explanations which may substantiate the blame game of the one side by 
presenting other side to be more belligerent. For example, it is generally perceived 
in India that strong hold of army and extended dictatorial rules in Pakistan are a 
significant source of hostilities. Whereas Pakistan accuses India to have shown 
belligerence based on its historic hostility dating back to 1948 land dispute in 
Jammu and Kashmir area which also resulted in the first outright war between both 
countries whereas each side is now holding up to a part of the disputed land 
divided by a line of control while each side has been claiming the ownership of the 
entire area [Retrieved from]. 
Murshed & Mamoon (2007) cover more than 50 years of the India Pakistan 
history, would help us understand whether the dynamics of conflict have been 
changing since the prevalence of initial hostilities and if so how one can positively 
exploit these changing dynamics for making a long term peace strategy.  
The study shows that initial hostilities resulting from Kashmir dispute has 
significantly hampered bilateral trade between the two nations. However, we also 
find that the converse is also true; more trade between India and Pakistan decreases 
conflict and any measures to improve the bilateral trade share is a considerable 
confidence building measure. In the short term, greater Indian access to Pakistani 
markets will help decrease hostilities between the two countries; whereas in the 
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long run as the peace is achieved, both countries could be exporting more to each 
other. Lately, there has been a high demand of cheaper Indian raw materials in 
Pakistani industries. A regional trade agreement along the lines of a South Asian 
Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) could enable freer access to the markets of 
member countries, and has a high potential for the improvement of relations 
between India and Pakistan on a long term basis. Pakistan and India’s degree of 
openness to world trade is the dominant economic factor in conflict resolution. One 
would imagine that in the counterfactual case of significant mutual inward 
investment, that too would also decrease mutual belligerent tendencies.  
Mamoon & Murshed (2007) also find that Pakistani military expenditure is 
more sensitive to hostilities with its Eastern neighbor whereas Indian military 
expenditure is not entirely Pakistan focused as India, the regional hegemon, has 
other domestic and international concerns to which its defence spending is targeted, 
besides its disputes with Pakistan. Overall, India may have shown more belligerent 
behavior towards its neighbor because of its greater military size. For example, 
India has unilaterally massed troops on Pakistan’s borders in 1951 and 2002. 
Indeed, there is some reverse causality between military proxies and conflict 
suggesting that Pakistan’s military build ups may be more reactive. Furthermore, it 
is also important to note that Indian part of Kashmir is house to India’s largest 
military contingent active in suppressing insurgency which India accuses was 
actively supported by Pakistani side. Overall military expenditures are still at high 
levels in both countries and are diverting scarce resources away from social 
development spending, such as on education, and poverty reduction. Education 
spending has been shown to be good for both peace and economic progress. 
Though one should note here that optimal level of military expenditure depend on 
level of economic development. At higher levels of economic development 
military budgets proportional to GDP may fall but in absolute terms they may very 
well rise. In other words, higher the levels of economic growth, wider would be the 
range of optimality in military budgets depending on the national and international 
security situation as more economically vibrant countries may also have more 
challenges to face as they are taking off to the next stage of economic prosperity. 
Thus some times arms race may only indicate the up keeping of deterrence 
between different parties. As in South Asia region, Indian deterrence is responding 
to Chinese defense capabilities where as Chinese deterrence may have been 
focused towards international stakeholders like USA while Pakistan may have to 
keep its deterrence against Indian military capabilities. While each country may 
keep its minimum self defined threshold level of deterrence, economic cooperation 
among them may bring them closer to each other where countries work with shared 
stakes to global economic well being. But to reach any such scenario, a country 
needs to become a significant part of global economy and any such status can be 
achieved party by economically integrating with other economies in the region. 
Thus irrespective of long term trends in military budgeting, a country may always 
consider a smart factor division of resources whereby resources are utilized for 
development in a more effective manner which is to suggest that national 
budgeting for any set of pre defined alternate years spend more on social welfare 
while holding onto proportional defense expenditures to some predefined set limits. 
However any such smart trade offs between development and defense cannot 
happen under heightened hostilities between neighbors or possibility of any such. 
In this context resolution of India Pakistan bilateral issues like Kashmir becomes 
all the more important to achieve sustainable path towards social development in 
the region while both countries may still retain their respective defense niches to 
supplement their progressing economic and political status regionally and globally.   
In an ideal world democracy between pairs of nations should reduce inter-state 
hostility according to the democratic peace hypothesis; this relationship in our case 
is present but weak. Peace initiatives, it should be remembered, are not the sole 
prerogative of democracies; they can also be made by countries which are less than 
perfectly democratic out of economic self-interest. Pakistan, in 2006 made 
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unilateral concessions on many disputed issues with India. Murshed & Mamoon 
(2007) support the liberal peace hypothesis. Economic progress and poverty 
reduction combined with greater openness to international trade in general are 
more significant drivers of peace between nations like India and Pakistan, rather 
than the independent contribution of a common democratic polity. So it is more 
economic interdependence rather than politics which is likely to contribute towards 
peaceful relations between India and Pakistan in the near future. In many ways, our 
finding echo Polcahek’s (1997) work across several dyads, where it is argued that 
democracies cooperate not because they have common political systems, but 
because their economies are intricately and intensively interdependent. As pointed 
by Hegre (2000), it is at these higher stages of economic development that the 
contribution of common democratic values to peace becomes more salient. 
Meaningful democracy cannot truly function where poverty is acute and endemic, 
even in ostensible democracies such as India. In the final analysis, it may be that 
democracy itself is an endogenous by-product of increased general prosperity, as 
suggested nearly half a century ago by Lipset (1960). Then and only then, will 
nations be able to fully comprehend Angell-Lanes’ (1910) arguments regarding the 
futility of inter-state conflict.   
In 2006, there was lot of uncertainty on both sides for any significant change in 
India-Pakistan relationships despite Pakistani regime’s bold decision to re evaluate 
its traditional stand on Kashmir as well as using bilateral trade as a confidence 
building measure. Some in Pakistan feared that peace initiatives like reducing 
tariffs for Indian goods would mean greater dependency on Indian produce. Taking 
into account the historically high hostility levels between two countries, any peace 
initiative or confidence building measure which leads to more market access to 
India is viewed with scepticism in Pakistan, as many fear that dependence on India 
may expose Pakistan to unnecessary pressures from India, and make it vulnerable 
to one sided solutions to the Kashmir dispute. Our analysis shows that in the long 
run the dependency on Indian cheap goods would actually decline and both 
countries would end up being equal trading partners. Thus more bilateral trade, far 
from creating any power imbalance between India and Pakistan, would equally 
distribute the gains. Pakistan may also fulfil its import needs more from the other 
developing countries such as China.   
However, Murshed & Mamoon (2007) presents some evidence of competition 
between India and Pakistan to trade with the rest of the world as our findings 
suggest that hostilities with its neighbour has a greater negative effect on Pakistan’s 
trading capabilities when compared to India. Hostilities on its Eastern border areas 
has over the time limited the scope of Pakistani domestic markets to effectively 
benefit from outside competition despite the fact that Pakistan is traditionally a 
more open economy. Though with peace, trade with rest of the world would 
increase for both countries in the short run, in the long run Pakistan would benefit 
more than India because of its greater openness and Indian trade would decline if 
India does not open up its economy further. In 2002, when Pakistan found some 
breathing space after a decade long economic crunch, which the country found 
itself into since late 1980s due to a mounting debt burden amid international 
sanctions, and as it was managing to benefit from international markets as 
sanctions were lifted for its cooperation in the War on Terror, an army build up by 
the Indian side on Pakistani borders, the largest in history, may show that India has 
used hostilities to offset Pakistan’s economic capabilities. Though negative effects 
for Pakistan have been greater, continued level of heightened hostilities also carried 
negative effects for India. For example, figure presented above show a dip in terms 
of trade of both countries in year 2002, where Pakistan’s terms of trade witnessing 
a deeper plunge due to Indian military build-up on its borders.   
Murshed & Mamoon (2007) also find that peace is not only good news for the 
economy, it is also good for security capabilities of both nations as decrease in 
hostilities would increase the efficiency of national defence apparatus of both 
countries in the longer run, as we find that both countries would decrease level of 
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militarization while may still incur higher defence expenditures only at higher 
levels of GDP to import high end technology military imports much like developed 
nations who keep smaller but well equipped armies. Though, such long run 
scenario is based on the assumption that Kashmir dispute would be solved.  
May be a similar vision of economic and security prospects of peace have 
motivated Pakistani side to take peace initiatives when President Musharraf had 
become the first Pakistani leader to show some flexibility in solving Kashmir 
dispute while showing willingness to set aside Pakistan’s traditional demand of 
plebiscite in Kashmir and Jammu region; a demand which has always been rejected 
by the Indian side for last 30 years or so. Pakistan has proven to have made a 
genuine effort towards peace in the region where they had also decreased tariffs on 
number of Indian products. How ever how India has undermined Pakistani peace 
initiatives by its continuous lukewarm response is matter of another debate as it 
appears how international community fairs with Pakistan in future matter for 
Indian policy towards Pakistan a lot. In this context, it can be suggested that India 
is playing an old game where it is buying its time out of peace yet again as it did in 
1970s when after East Pakistan debacle, India back tracked on its commitment over 
plebiscite in Kashmir and eventually won over the argument at least on 
international forums where now a days indeed any demand of self determination of 
a segment of Kashmiri population out of a economically prospering nation like 
India seems an unconvincing argument especially under an international economic 
wisdom which is in favour of globalisation.  
There is also evidence that in 2006 Indian army did not share the same 
enthusiasm as was shown by the government of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh. For example early this year on 8 January 2007, Indian army by going 
against their government line came out in the local media strongly opposing any 
consideration by Indian side to the proposal put on table by Pakistan to administer 
Jammu and Kashmir in a joint management framework to further curtail down 
hostilities:  
A spokesman of the Army here stressed that there could not be a joint 
management between a military dictator of Pakistan and a democracy like 
India. The spokesman described "joint management" as a "dangerous 
proposal" because it would dilute India's control on two-thirds of the original 
state of J and K. For the first time the Army has come out against the much-
hyped proposal of Pakistan with the spokesman saying that Pakistan is toying 
with the idea of an "out-of-box" solution called "joint management" of the J 
and K state, but it was dangerous for India. [Retrieved from]. 
Quite interestingly, on December 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asked 
both sides to forget about the past in favor for an optimistic future as he rightly 
realized that the destinies of both nations are intricately interconnected. A day 
before the statement came out, Pakistan decreased tariffs on a significant number 
of main Indian goods imported to the country, which could have easily been took 
as an indirect indication of giving India a status of most favored nation. It makes an 
insightful observation then that few days later in January 2007, Indian army 
leadership would undermine the whole atmosphere of peace building by an 
uncalled for press statement while also making a political comment by referring to 
the prevalent governance structure in Pakistan. This may suggest either lack of 
Indian sincerity towards peace building in the region or it may indicate that Indian 
army may have a Kashmir or Pakistan policy which is somewhat exogenous to 
what is being planned out in the Indian Prime Minister secretariat and thus 
seriously undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the Indian government to 
carry out its own foreign policy yet again questioning the fundamentals of Indian 
democracy.  
 
3. Cross border challenges for post 2008 democratic Pakistan 
The tensions between India and Pakistan have been escalated amid global 
financial crises and relative plummeting of growth rates in both countries. 
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Currently hostilities are at the highest for the last 15 years or so. The talk of 
surgical strikes within Pakistani borders is common talk across the border. Pakistan 
is maligned by India in international forums frequently and even at prime 
ministerial level. SAARC summit in Pakistan was cancelled last year due to the 
boycott of India. While the air of confrontation is happening actively from the 
Indian side, unrest in Indian held Kashmir has been at its peak not seen since the 
advent of 21st century. From the Pakistani side, the two successive democratic 
governments of Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz are 
trying hard to bring India to the negotiation table but with little success. A docile 
reaction to Indian war mongering has created many rifts between civil military 
relationships in Pakistan. The current geo political situation in South Asia is mired 
with uncertainty due to worsening Pakistan India relationship. As rightly pointed 
out by Murshed & Mamoon (2007), democratic orientation has a very limited role 
to play in bringing India and Pakistan closer to peace as suggested by the recent 
history of the subcontinent. If any, economic success on account of both countries 
would create an environment where India may respond to Pakistan’s peace 
initiatives. India has missed the 2006 peace train. The discussion in above sections 
and in light of Murshed & Mamoon (2007) analysis suggest that India has been 
trying to find ways out of peace. The only deterrence for Pakistan to extreme 
hostile action or high level of hostilities from across the border is a strong military 
posture from the Pakistani side. It is in Indian interest to weaken that posture to 
dominate regional politics and economics. The domestic political and social issues 
are a clear handicap of Pakistan to take up a road to sustainable and stable 
democratic path. Constant hostilities emanating from the Indian side is not helping 
the situation in favor of democratic governments of Pakistan. Such is the 
challenging situation despite a dovish stance of incumbent political party PML N 
towards India. This provides a circumstantial evidence that India has hijacked the 
peace within South Asia and is ready to miss opportunities of peaceful solutions to 
bilateral disputes in the future also. 
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